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THE EFFECT OF PROPOSED RULES 7 THROUGH 25 ON
PRESENT WASHINGTON PROCEDURES: PART H
ROBERT MEISENHOLDER*
Proposed rules 7 through 12 of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure, recommended by the Judicial Council and published by
the Supreme Court, were considered in the Autumn, 1957, issue of the
Law Review.' This second article includes comment on the general
changes in present practice which would be made by proposed rules
13 through 25 and by proposed rule 42. These rules are concerned
primarily with parties and joinder of claims. In run-of-the-mine cases
they will not be as important as the pleading rules already discussed.
In general, our present law concerning joinder of causes of action
and joinder of parties is sometimes arbitrary. In many instances it is
uncertain. There are unexplained gaps in the governing court rules,
statutes, and case law. In situations where a rule has been established
some of the pertinent case law is almost literally buried because it
cannot be discovered by ordinary research methods.
Regardless of particular advantages or disadvantages of any of the
proposed joinder rules, it is clear that they would at least substitute
a logical, coherent and unified system for the present hodgepodge.
Comparatively, they offer a more readily accessible, understandable,
and usable set of rules than is embodied in present Washington law.
The proposed rules are reproduced below to indicate the similar
federal rule as well as the proposed rule. For the text of the federal
rule, read the rule with matter in brackets, omitting matter in italics.
For the text of the proposed Washington rule, read the text with mat-




Unlike some of the other federal rules, federal rule 13 has evoked
little written comment-favorable or otherwise. This is somewhat
surprising in view of its provision for compulsory counterclaims and
its liberal policy for permissible counterclaims. Perhaps this lack of
comment is due to the fact that similar provisions were in existence
in the federal rules governing equity cases prior to 1938.2
* Professor, School of Law, University of Washington.
1 149 Wash. Dec. i-xix (1957).
2 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. 514 (1950).
PROPOSED RULES
The general purpose of the rule is the avoidance of multiplicity of
suits. It requires or authorizes counterclaims by original parties,
parties who are brought in, and parties who intervene.'
Any counterclaim would have to be a claim under rule 8 (a) entitling
the pleader to relief against the opposing party. Therefore, except as
indicated below, a counterclaim would include the types of demands
made by defendants which are now labeled counterclaims, setoffs, and
cross-complaints in Washington.
Rule 13 would replace the Washington statutes concerning counter-
claims and setoffs and the Washington case law concerning cross-
claims or cross-complaints to the extent indicated in the following
discussion.
Rule 13 (a)
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counter-
claim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim
need not be so stated if at the time the action was commenced the
claim was the subject of another pending action.
Compulsory Counterclaims. This section provides for compulsory
counterclaims, which would be new in this state.' A counterclaim
would be compulsory under the following conditions: (1) if it arose
before the time of serving the pleading containing the counterclaim,
unless at the time the original action was commenced the counterclaim
was the subject of another pending action; (2) if it were against any
8 Ordinarily a counterclaim will be pleaded by the original defendant. However, asindicated in the text which follows, a counterclaim may be made by plaintiff in the
reply. A third party defendant brought into the case under rule 14 is authorized to
make a permissive counterclaim and is required to make a compulsory counterclaim
under the terms of that rule.
4Compulsory counterclaims are provided for in a few code pleading systems. CLARx,
CODE PLEADING 646, note 54 (1947). In Washington if a counterclaim is an inde-pendent cause of action, the defendant may elect not to plead it even though it is con-
nected with the subject of plaintiff's action. If he does not do so, a judgment in the
case will not bar defendant from a subsequent independent action based on the claim
nor deprive him of the right of asserting the claim as a counterclaim or defense in a
subsequent action. Scott v. Holcomb, 149 Wash. Dec. 377 (1956), and cases cited
therein. Diamond Ice & S. Co. v. Klock Produce Co., 103 Wash. 369, 174 Pac. 435(1918), 110 Wash. 683, 189 Pac. 257 (1920), and Jansen v. Kolmitz, 130 Wash. 314,
226 Pac. 1025 (1924), are instructive cases on this point.
However, it is also true that if proof of a counterclaim would defeat the plaintiff's
cause of action, and the counterclaim is not asserted, judgment for the plaintiff bars alater assertion of the counterclaim by independent suit or otherwise. Judish v. Rovig
Lumber Co., 128 Wash. 287, 222 Pac. 898 (1924) ; Olsen v. Title Trust Co., 58 Wash.
599, 109 Pac. 49 (1910). To the extent this rule is operative, it could be argued that
there is a species of compulsory counterclaim now effective.
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opposing party; (3) if it arose out of the transaction or occurrence
which was the subject of the opposing party's claim; and (4) if it did
not require the presence of third parties of whom the court could not
acquire jurisdiction. No penalty would be incurred in the action in
which a compulsory counterclaim was omitted, but the principle of
res judicata would operate to bar the later assertion of the compulsory
counterclaim by an independent suit or otherwise.5
All present permissive counterclaims and setoffs relating to the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the suit would be
compulsory counterclaims.' Claims relating to the subject matter of
the suit which are now asserted in "cross-complaints" against the
opposing party would also be compulsory counterclaims."
Transaction or Occurrence. Conditions (1) and (2), listed above,
apply in part to permissive counterclaims and will be discussed below
in connection with rule 13 (e) and rule 13 (b) respectively. Condition
(3) above states the principal feature distinguishing a compulsory
counterclaim from a permissive counterclaim as outlined in proposed
subdivision (b). Compulsory counterclaims are those relating to the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the opposing party's
claim; permissive counterclaims are all other claims against the oppos-
ing party.
What is a "transaction or occurrence" within rule 13 (a)? Generally
speaking, these terms are broad and include any set of facts or cir-
cumstances unified in logic or in actual life. A leading federal case
describes a "transaction" as a "word of flexible meaning. It may com-
5 3 MOORE, FEDEAL PRACTICE 28 (1948).
6 See discussion of rule 13(b) for a possible qualification of this statement concern-
ing setoff. The presently authorized counterclaim arising out of the contract or trans-
action set forth in the complaint would become a compulsory counterclaim. In an action
arising on contract RCW 4.32.100 also authorizes counterclaims on any other cause
of action arising also on contract. Such counterclaims would be permissive under
rule 13(b). With the qualification indicated in the discussion of rule 13(b), setoffs
against the plaintiff which do not relate to the contract sued upon (as authorized by
RCW 4.32.110) would be permissive counterclaims. Present setoffs related to the
contract which is the subject of the suit would be compulsory counterclaims.
7 In some states a "cross-complaint" relates to a procedure formerly used in equity
cases. BANCROFT, CODE PLaDING 648 (1926). In practice in Washington, it appears
that possible distinctions between such a "cross-complaint" by a defendant against a
plaintiff and a "counterclaim" against the plaintiff are usually ignored. No cases have
been discovered which delineate any definite scope of a cross-complaint against the
plaintiff as distinguished from a counterclaim against the plaintiff. See, for example,
Northwestern & P. H. Bank v. Ridpath, 29 Wash. 687, 70 Pac. 139 (1902); and
Chandler v. Miller, 172 Wash. 252, 19 P.2d 1108 (1933). As between plaintiff and
defendant, the terms "counterclaim" and "cross-complaint' are used without distinction
in a number of opinions. See, for example, Duggar v. Dempsey, 13 Wash. 396, 43 Pac.
357 (1896) ; Reynolds v. Dickson, 48 Wash. 407, 93 Pac. 910 (1908) ; Caine v. Seattle
& Northern Ry Co., 12 Wash. 596, 41 Pac. 904 (1895) ; Ingersoll v. Clapp, 179 Wash.
335, 37 P.2d 895 (1934). For cases concerning cross-complaints against co-parties,
see discussion of Rule 13 (g).
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prebend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon
the immediateness of their connection as upon their logical relation."'
Many cases illustrate this idea.' Any unified fact occurrence in real
life, such as an automobile accident, would be an "occurrence." This
term is not intended to limit the term "transaction."
Thus, the definition of the area of compulsory counterclaim is some-
what similar to the definition of the area in which a permissive coun-
terclaim may now be made on the ground that it relates to the trans-
action which is the subject of plaintiff's action.1
Jurisdiction and Venue. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
compulsory counterclaim would rarely be challenged in view of the
fact that the superior courts are courts of general jurisdiction. If there
were no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim it
probably would not have to be asserted." If the counterclaim involved
persons who were not parties to the suit but who would be indispen-
sable parties to the counterclaim under proposed rule 19, and if personal
jurisdiction of such persons could not be obtained, the counterclaim
would not have to be asserted.
Venue requirements would probably be treated as follows. If the
presence of a third person as an indispensable party were required by
the counterclaim and his presence violated venue rules, he could make
a venue objection. 2 However, plaintiff could probably not object to
an original defendant's counterclaim against the original plaintiff on
the basis of ordinary venue statutes. In federal court it has been held
that a plaintiff waives venue objections to counterclaims against him
by bringing his action." A similar rule now prevails in most states as
to permissive counterclaims which relate to the transaction that is the
subject matter of the suit. 4
8 Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
9 For example, plaintiff sued defendant on an account for goods sold and delivered
pursuant to a distributorship contract. Several counterclaims involving breaches of the
distributorship agreement were compulsory counterclaims. Parmelee v. Chicago Eye
Shield Co., 157 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1946).
10 RCW 4.32.100.
1l In federal court there is jurisdiction over a compulsory counterclaim if there is
jurisdiction over plaintiff's case because it involves a federal question, even though
there is no independent ground for jurisdiction of the federal court over the counter-
claim. See discussion, 6 CYcLoPEDa oF Fxnana PRocEDuRE 48-54 (1951). But in state
court an analogous rule would not have to be followed in jurisdictional matters because
the above rule is a federal jurisdictional rule involving a matter not governed by rule
13. It seems logical to conclude that rule 13 does not bear on the subject.
'
2 Contracting Division, A. C. Horn Corp. v. New York Life Insurance Co., 113
F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1940).
13 General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932). However
this rule may be considered an interpretation of federal venue requirements. It is not
dealt with by rule 13(a).
14 Cases are collected in Note, 129 A.L.R. 915 (1940).
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The Washington venue statutes which are jurisdictional (such as the
venue statute relating to actions involving real property) probably
would have a different effect. Plaintiff would probably not waive
objection to venue of a counterclaim under these statutes merely by
bringing his suit. 5 For example, if a defendant were in the rather
unusual position of having a compulsory counterclaim against the
plaintiff involving real property in a county other than the county
in which plaintiff had brought his action, it seems that plaintiff would
be able to object to such a counterclaim because the court would not
have jurisdiction of it.
Declaratory Judgment Actions. Some question has been raised under
the federal rule as to whether compulsory counterclaims must be made
in declaratory judgment actions. Federal cases have split on the ques-
tion of whether a counterclaim for declaratory relief is proper, but
indicate that rule 13 governs counterclaims of defendant in declara-
tory suits against him."6
Rule 13 (b)
Permissive Counterclaims. A pleading may state as a counterclaim
any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
As under present Washington law, this rule permits contract claims
against the opposing party which are not related to the transaction that
is the subject of the suit, and which are now properly the subject of
setoff and counterclaim, to be asserted as counterclaims.1 7 But it is
much broader than present Washington law. In addition, any type of
unrelated claim against an opposing party could be asserted. Presum-
ably if plaintiff sued the defendant for alienation of affections of his
wife, defendant could counterclaim by seeking damages for breach of
a contract.
Thus, our statute on permissive counterclaim would be entirely abro-
gated.18
In a suit on an express or implied contract, RCW 4.32.110 author-
izes setoff by the defendant of "any demand of a like nature against
the plaintiff in interest." To this extent RCW 4.32.110 would also
be replaced. However, this statute also provides that, except in actions
on negotiable instruments under certain circumstances, the defendant
35 See footnote 11. No analogous Washington case has been found.
16 Cases are reviewed in 6 CYCLOPEDiA oF FEDRRAL PROCEDURE 46-48 (1951).
3- RCW 4.32.100; RCW 4.32.110. Assertion against an assignee of claims against




may set off a contract demand existing against the prior assignor
of the contract claim upon which the plaintiff is suing. Does the pro-
posed rule cover such setoffs against a prior holder of plaintiff's claim
when it provides for counterclaims against the "opposing party"? If
it does not, the setoff statute would continue to be effective insofar as
it provides for setoffs good against plaintiff's assignor (in contract
cases only).
There is a federal case which holds that the compulsory counter-
claim rule governs counterclaims against the subrogor when plaintiff
is a subrogee and that the subrogor should be brought in as an addi-
tional necessary party for the granting of relief to the defendant. 9
It is therefore arguable that the proposed rule would abrogate the
above statute insofar as it authorizes setoffs against an assignor to be
asserted against a plaintiff assignee, when the setoff relates to the
contract sued upon.
In addition, the statute allows setoffs of unrelated contract claims
against a prior holder to be asserted against an assignee-plaintiff who
is suing on an assigned contract. It is not at all clear that the federal
rule authorizes the defendant to assert any permissive claims under
the rule against an assignor in the suit by the assignee. Perhaps it does
not. If so, it could be urged that our setoff statute would not be abro-
gated to the extent that it allows setoff of unrelated contract claims
against the assignor to be asserted in a suit by an assignee. If the rule
is adopted, the supreme court could at the same time settle this prob-
lem and indicate whether or not the rule is intended to replace the
setoff statutes entirely.
Three other setoff statutes present a similar problem. RCW 4.32.120
authorizes similar setoffs of contract claims against a person benefi-
cially interested in plaintiff's suit when plaintiff is a trustee or has
no real interest in the contract sued upon by him. RCW 4.32.130
allows setoffs of demands against testators or intestates in suits brought
by executors and administrators. RCW 4.32.140 allows setoffs of
claims of testators and intestates against plaintiffs who sue executors
and administrators in their representative capacities. No direct
authority has been discovered for similar counterclaims under the
federal rule.
The previous comment on venue of compulsory counterclaims applies
to permissive counterclaims. There would have to be independent
10 General Casualty Co. of America v. Fedoff, 11 F.R.D. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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jurisdiction over the subject matter of the permissive counterclaim."0
A counterclaim could be asserted in a reply. 1 At present this is not
possible except in limited situations 2
The time at which counterclaims must exist is discussed below.
Rule 13 (c)
Counterclaim Exceeding Opposing Claim. A counterclaim may or
may not diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party.
It may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that
sought in the pleading of the opposing party.
This is the subdivision which indicates that a counterclaim under
the rule involves both legal and equitable setoffs under present rules
as well as present counterclaims which involve affirmative relief beyond
a setoff. At present a setoff involves a contract type of claim only.
A counterclaim may involve a contract type of claim, or it may involve
some other type of claim relating to the transaction which is the sub-
ject of plaintiff's suit. As a practical matter this distinction is not
bothersome, but it would be abolished. A permissive counterclaim
under the rule could be any type of claim, including one greater or
less in amount than plaintiff's claim.
Rule 13 (d)
Reserved. [Counterclaim Against the United States. These rules
shall not be construed to enlarge beyond the limits now fixed by law the
right to assert counterclaims or to claim credits against the United
States or an officer or agency thereof.]
This federal rule is properly omitted from the proposed rules.
Rule 13 (e)
Counterclaim Maturing or Acquired After Pleading. A claim
which either matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his
pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a
counterclaim by supplemental pleading.
As already mentioned, under subdivision (a) a counterclaim other-
wise compulsory would not have to be made by a defendant if the
claim had not matured at the time the defendant served his answer."2
20 See discussion in 3 MooRE, F EAm. PRAcTIcE 53-57 (1948).
21 See Ivey v. Daus, 17 F.R.D. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
22In Green v. Harris, 113 Wash. 259, 193 Pac. 690 (1920), the court approved
allegations of a setoff in the reply to defendant's counterclaim when the setoff was not
connected with the subject matter of the complaint. The general rule seems to be that
a claim which plaintiff could have pleaded affirmatively in the complaint may not be
pleaded in the reply as a counterclaim upon which relief may be sought. See Note, 42
A.L.R. 564 (1926).
23 Cases are collected in 3 MooRE, FFaDEA. PRAcTICE 86, note 3 (1948).
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Nor would it have to be made if it had matured at that time and were
the subject of another pending suit at the time the current suit was
commenced against the defendant. It might be noted that this latter
condition would apply only if the other suit were pending in a court of
another jurisdiction. If the claim of defendant were pending in a suit
commenced by defendant in Washington when the suit of plaintiff
was commenced in Washington, plaintiff would probably be required
to make his claim as a compulsory counterclaim in defendant's suit.
Although no clear federal authority has been found, a counterclaim
which would be permissive under subdivision (b) probably could not
be made as a matter of right if it matured after the defendant served
his answer.
Rule 13 (e) is closely connected with the above provisions. It allows
the defendant (or the pleader) to assert a counterclaim maturing after
service of the answer (or his pleading) with the permission of the
court. Under present rules in Washington, setoffs and counterclaims
against the plaintiff which do not relate to the subject matter of the
suit must mature and belong to the defendant at the time the suit is
commenced by plaintiff.24
If counterclaims otherwise compulsory matured after service of
answer, they could be made under this section, but they would not be
compulsory counterclaims. It might be unusual for such counterclaims
to be unmatured as a practical matter, but it would not be unusual for
permissive counterclaims under rule 13 (b) to mature after the answer
is served by the defendant.
The subdivision provides for the assertion of counterclaims "acquired
by the pleader after serving his pleading." On its face, this wording
would allow the defendant to buy up assignable counterclaims after
he served his answer and assert them with permission of the court.
Federal cases indicate that if an after-acquired counter-claim is
related to the plaintiff's claim, the court might give permission to assert
it. 5 This would probably be an unusual situation. If such counter-
claim were unrelated to plaintiff's claim, one of the factors for the
court to consider would be whether the defendant acquired the coun-
24 RCW 4.32.100; RCV 4.32.110. Counterclaims that do not relate to the transaction
which is the subject of the action must exist at the time of commencement of the suit.
Conner v. Scott, 16 Wash. 371, 47 Pac. 761 (1897) ; Farmers and Merchants Bank v.
Eagon, 122 Wash. 586, 211 Pac. 278 (1922). The majority rule is that if the counter-
claim relates to the transaction which is the subject of the suit, it need not exist at the
commencement of the suit. 80 C.J.S. 36 (1953). No Washington case has been found.
25 General Motors Corp. v. Kolodin, 16 F.R.D. 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
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terclaim to harass the plaintiff in conducting his suit.2"
In any event assignable claims purchased by the defendant prior
to the filing of his answer could be asserted as counterclaims. In this
instance, rule 13 may favor an astute defendant if he has no defense
and is sued by a plaintiff who has various matured debts and against
whom a judgment cannot be collected. Even under present practice in
contract cases, contract causes of action acquired by defendant prior
to commencement of suit may be asserted against the plaintiff."
Rule 13 (f)
Omitted Counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counter-
claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when
justice requires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by
amendment.
It is sometimes objected that a defendant, and particularly his attor-
ney, may not even know that defendant has a compulsory counter-
claim-a matured claim relating to the transaction or occurrence which
is the subject of the suit. Or it is said that the defendant or his attorney
may overlook it. Much of such danger could be avoided by some
investigation prior to answer. The risk of overlooking a compulsory
counterclaim would still exist, however, and rule 13 (f) is designed to
give protection to the defendant under such circumstances. This sec-
tion should, therefore, be construed with liberality if a compulsory
counterclaim has been omitted. One federal court allowed an omitted
counterclaim to be filed where it would not delay trial, although it
''was not due to any oversight or inadvertence but to inexcusable
neglect."2 Lack of good faith and prejudice to plaintiff are important
factors for the court to consider in exercising its discretion.29
The problem of ascertaining whether a known claim is a com-
pulsory counterclaim or a permissive counterclaim is somewhat related
to the above problem. Unless there is some strong practical reason
for other action, a counterclaim which cannot be easily classified should
be asserted.
Subdivision (f) also covers late assertion of a permissive counter-
claim, but refusal of permission to make such a counterclaim is not as
vital to defendant as in the case of a compulsory counterclaim.
26 General Motors Corp. v. Kolodin, note 25 supra, and cases cited therein. See
discussion in 3 MooR, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 85-88 (1948).
:27This is the general rule. 47 Am.Jur., Setoff and Counterclaim, §63 (1943).
28Singer Mfg. Co. v. Shepard, 13 F.tRD. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). (The opinion
seems to indicate that the counterclaim involved in this case was permissive.)
29 See discussion in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcnicE 89-90 (1948).
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There is no time limit for securing leave to assert an omitted coun-
terclaim, but request to assert such counterclaim should be timely in
view of the particular excuse for omitting it and other pertinent cir-
cumstances."
At present there is no similar Washington statute or rule covering
permissive counterclaims or setoffs.
Rule 13 (g)
Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-
claim any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is
the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include
a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) of rule 13 provide that counterclaims are
claims against an opposing party. Subdivision (g) authorizes certain
claims to be made as cross-claims against a co-party (not an opposing
party prior to the time the cross-claim is made). This nomenclature
should be kept in mind because the term, "cross-claim," is sometimes
used in state practice to describe a claim against an opposing party.
In Washington there is no authority by statute or court rule for the
cross-claim outlined in the proposed rule, but there is case authority
supporting such a procedure in certain situations. The Washington
cases seem to be consistent with the idea that the plaintiff must be
affected by the cross-claim, or possibly, in the alternative, that there
is a claim of indemnity by one defendant against a co-defendant in
connection with the cause of action asserted against them by the plain-
tiff.3" However, Washington authority is sparse, and the permissible
S0 Counterclaim allowed after action had been pending for three years. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Eastern ?. R. Presidents Conference, 19 F.R.D. 146 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
Permission refused after close of trial. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. United
States, 134 F. Supp. 340 (N.D. Cal. 1955).31 In a leading case, Hill v. Frink, 11 Wash. 562, 40 Pac. 128 (1895), plaintiff
brought suit to foreclose a laborer's lien on a certain quantity of wheat owned by
Frink. Defendants who claimed a lien on the wheat asserted a cross-claim against a
co-defendant who held a chattel mortgage on the wheat and was charged in the cross-
claim with converting it. The court held that the cross-claim was in no way connected
with or dependent upon the cause of action asserted by plaintiff and that it was not
embraced in the plaintiff's complaint. No very clear rule is established by this case.
However, in Maher & Co. v. Farnandis, 70 Wash- 250, 126 Pac. 542 (1912), a second
subcontractor sued the first subcontractor, the principal contractor, and the owner of a
building to foreclose on a lien for excavation work for the building and to recover the
reasonable value of his work and services. On an appeal the court held it was proper
for the first subcontractor to deny liability to the plaintiff and to assert a cross-claim
against the principal contractor for the contract price of the work he had sublet to the
plaintiff (the second subcontractor), apparently on a finding that the principal con-
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scope of a cross-complaint against a co-defendant is not clear.'
In contrast, the proposed rule states the scope of the cross-claim
rather clearly. The wording referring to "transactions" and "occur-
rence" should be given the interpretation assigned to those words in
the definition of a compulsory counterclaim. 8 This concept adopts a
general rule for cross-claims which is followed in some code pleading
states.8
Although the cross-claim authorized is limited to claims against co-
parties, if a person not a party is also involved in a cross-claim against
a co-party, he may be brought in as an additional party under sub-
division (h) reproduced below. With this qualification, cross-claims
under rule 13 (g) involve only present co-parties to a suit, whereas
third-party practice under proposed rule 14 involves the bringing in
of persons who are not parties to the suit.
Typical suits in which a defendant might possibly assert that a co-
defendant is liable to him include actions against surety and principal,
employer and employee, persons alleged to be joint promisors, and
other cases involving primary and secondary liability or liability for
contribution as between defendants.8 5
It is clear that rule 13(g) does not authorize a cross-claim by a
defendant against an insurance company with which the defendant has
a liability policy and which is not a party to the suit. Nor does it
authorize the plaintiff to make such an insurance company a party
to plaintiff's suit. However, when multiple defendants are proper parties
under rule 19, the rule authorizes cross-claims.
The cross-claim must involve more than assertion of non-liability
tractor had promised to pay him for the work done by the plaintiff. This case seems
explainable on the theory that the principal contractor was in a position similar to an
indemnitor. Huxtable v. Berg, 98 Wash. 616, 168 Pac. 187 (1917), is a case in which it
appears that a cross-claim affected the relief sought by the plaintiff in the suit. Pere-
grine v. West Seattle State Bank, 120 Wash. 653, 208 Pac. 35 (1922), involves a
judgment in favor of one defendant against another when the latter was in effect an
indemnitor by law. Finally, in Riverside Finance Company v. Otis Automatic Train
Control, 140 Wash. 495, 249 Pac. 979 (1926), the court held a cross-complaint against
co-defendants had been properly stricken. The cross-complaint clearly had no relation
to the complaint of plaintiff, but one reason for the decision (repeated two times) was
that the matter pleaded in the cross-claim "did not constitute a defense to plaintiff's
action." If this were the law of Washington, there would be few opportunities for
cross-claims against co-defendants.
82 See footnote 30, supra.
33 See discussion of proposed rule 13 (a).34 CLAIM, CODE PLEADING 677-678 (1947).
35 However the rule authorizes cross-claims when technical contribution or second-
ary liability doctrines are not involved. For example, see Sebo v. United Air Lines,
10 F.R.D. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), in which an airline defendant cross-claimed against
the manufacturer defendant because of breach of duty to it in connection with an
accident in which plaintiff's decedent was killed.
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to the plaintiff or assertion that the co-defendant is solely liable to
plaintiff. Although it must be a claim which would entitle the cross-
claimant to affirmative relief against a co-party, the cross-claim may
be contingent on the ultimate outcome of plaintiff's suit. This result
follows from the last sentence of subdivision (g).
Rule 13 (h)
Additional Parties May Be Brought In. When the presence of
parties other than those to the original action is required for the grant-
ing of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-
claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants as
provided in these rules, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained [and
their joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction of the action.].
This subdivision should not be confused with rule 14. It authorizes
additional parties to be brought in if their presence is required to
decide a counterclaim or cross-claim against parties already in the suit.
In effect it means that rule 19 should be applied to counterclaims
and cross-claims. That rule specifies when and how certain persons
must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
No Washington authority exactly in point has been found, but it
seems possible that cross-complaints which are now authorized against
co-defendants in Washington may also include third parties as defend-
ants, and such defendants may be brought into the suit if they are
necessary parties. 6
Rule 13 (i)
Separate Trials: Separate Judgment. If the court orders separate
trials as provided in Rule [42 (b)]- , judgment on a counter-
claim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance with the terms of
Rule [54 (b) ]- [when the court has jurisdiction so to do], even
if the claims of the opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of.
Here the philosophy of rule 13 is emphasized-counterclaims and
cross-claims should be handled primarily with a view to trial conveni-
ence and fairness.
Since a permissive counterclaim could be any kind of claim against
the opposing party, trial of the original claim and a permissive counter-
claim in one suit might well be extremely inconvenient and unfair.
The court is therefore authorized to order separate trials by federal
rules 42(b) and 54(b), which rules are also proposed by the Judicial
Council for adoption in this state. If it is inconvenient to try a com-
36Rule 2 (3), Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 34A Wn.2d; RCW 4.08.130
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pulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim with an original claim, the court
also could order separate trials and render separate judgments pur-
suant to those rules. This matter is discussed further in connection
with proposed rule 42, below.
Proposed Rule 14
TH D-PARTY PRACTiCE
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. Before the service
of his answer a defendant may move ex parte or, after the service of
his answer, on notice to the plaintiff, for leave as a third-party plaintiff
to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him. If the motion is granted and the summons and
complaint are served, the person so served, hereinafter called the third-
party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's
claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-
party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as
provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert against the
plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plain-
tiff's claim. The third-party defendant may also assert any claim
against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party
defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff,
and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as
provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and cross-claims as provided
in Rule 13. A third-party defendant may proceed under this rule
against any person not a party to the action who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-
party defendant.
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. When a counter-
claim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be
brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a
defendant to do so.
A third-party practice much broader than the present Washington
third-party practice would be authorized by this rule."
In Washington only restricted procedures are available to a defend-
ant if he has a claim or potential claim against a third person (who is
not a party to the suit) for all or part of plaintiff's claim against him.
37 Prior to the adoption of the federal rule, a somewhat similar third-party practice
had been in effect at least in limited areas in Texas, Louisiana, New York, Pennsyl-
vania and Wisconsin. See 3 Mooan, FEDERAL PRAcncE 462-490 (1948) for detailed




The principal existing procedure is that of "vouching in" a third
person by giving him notice to come in and defend the suit. The third
person cannot be made a party against his wish. But, if he does not
come in and defend after notice from defendant, he is bound by a
judgment against defendant when he is sued by defendant on his
liability over.38 There is a further limitation of this procedure which
is exemplified by the Washington cases but not discussed in any of
the opinions. A third person is not bound by a judgment after notice
of suit from defendant unless the third person is liable over by agree-
ment or by law for the very judgment obtained against the defendant
and, therefore, ought to have an obligation to defend in the suit against
the defendant."
There is also an intimation in the Washington cases that a defend-
ant could bring in another person liable over to him against that per-
son's wish, but no conclusive authority for such a procedure has been
discovered."
In contrast to the rules for "vouching in" a party, the provisions of
proposed rule 14 are broader in scope as mentioned below and also
contemplate bringing in the third party regardless of his desires. Of
course, it would never be mandatory under rule 14 for the original
defendant to bring in the third party. As an alternative he could later
prosecute an independent suit against the third party. Nor would rule
14 replace or abrogate the practice of "vouching in" a third party.4"
That practice could still be followed by defendants if they considered
it desirable.
The rule would be applicable in any case in which an original
defendant asserts that a third person, not a party to the suit, is or
may be liable to the original defendant for plaintiff's claim against the
original defendant. Typical cases in which the rule could be applied
are those in which an indemnitor or surety is sued originally, those in
which a person secondarily liable is sued, and those in which a defend-
ant who is sued can claim contribution against a third party.42 It is
38 This doctrine is generally explained in 67 C.J.S. 1073-74 (1950) ; 50 CJ.S. 360-
364 (1947) ; 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 972-1002 (5th ed. 1925).89 See footnote 51, infra, and related discussion.40 In State ex rel Continental Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Wn.2nd 839, 207
P.2d 707 (1949), the court held that it was within the discretion of the trial court to
refuse a motion by a defendant-indemnitor to bring in the indemnitee as a defendant
and settle the liability, if any, between indemnitor and indemnitee. It was said that had
the motion been granted there would have been no abuse of discretion. A somewhat
similar statement is contained in the opinion in Watkdns v. Siler Logging Co., 9 Wn.2d
703, 116 P.2d 315 (1941). See also Randa v. Bear, 150 Wash. Dec. 392 (1957).
41 See 3 MooRa, FEDEnAL PRCAcncE 408 (1948).
12 Cases are collected in 6 CYcLOEiA op FEDERAL PRocE urE 86-87 (1951) and
1956 Cum. Supp., 17-21.
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important to note that the rule is merely procedural; it would create
no substantive right of indemnity or liability of a third party over to
a defendant. If there is such a liability in substantive law, then the
rule would merely furnish the original defendant in a suit an optional
method of enforcing the liability. For example, since the general
Washington rule is that there is no contribution between joint tort-
feasors, proposed rule 14 would not be available to one joint tortfeasor
against whom a suit is brought."
Space limitations forbid detailed discussion of many types of
examples, but the rule could come into play in suits against an original
defendant who had a liability insurance policy, or suits against a
defendant on a warranty or for negligence involving injury from a
product sold by defendant."" It is thought that a clause in a liability
policy which requires the insurer to cooperate in defending suits
against the insured would prevent the bringing in of the insurer unless
the insurer has disclaimed liability and refused to defend." Although
impleader is in the discretion of the court, in most cases the federal
courts have granted the impleader when the insurer disclaimed
liability." The rule would permit an insured defendant to implead his
insurer on a liability policy even though the policy had a so-called
"no-action" clause.47 Perhaps the trial court could deny impleader in
a jury case on the ground that the jury would be prejudiced by the
presence of the insurer."8 But the usual course of the federal courts
to avoid such prejudice has been to grant the impleader and order a
separate trial in the impleader action."
The Texas third-party rule deals with this matter in another way.
Substantially a copy of federal rule 14, it contains the added provision
that the rule "shall not be applied, in tort cases, so as to permit the
-3 See Seattle v. Shorrock, 100 Wash. 234, 170 Pac. 590 (1918), and cases cited
therein; Duncan v. Judge, 43 Wn.2d 836, 264 P.2d 865 (1953).
44 Illustrative cases include Saunders v. Goldstein, 30 F. Supp. 150 (1939) (war-
ranty case); Jeub v. BIG Foods, Inc., 52 F.R.Serv. 14a 112, Case 2, 2 F.R.D. 238
(1942) (negligence case).
45 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Proceedings of the American Bar Associa-
tion Institute, Cleveland, 250-254 (1938).
48 See review of cases in Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern
Pleading Rules, 36 MINN. L. Rav. 580, 616 (1952). However, one recent federal case
has denied the impleader. Ballard v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 145 F. Supp. 886
(E.D.S.C. 1956).
47 Jordan v. Stephens, 9 F.R.Serv. 14a.221, Case 1, 7 F.R.D. 140 (W.D.Mo. 1945);
McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Mach. Co., 17 F.R.Serv. 14a.221, Case 1 (E.D.Pa.
1952).
48 In Ballard v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., supra note 46, the federal court denied the
impleader in part on this ground.
49 Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp. 413 (Md. 1939). Granting of separate trials after
allowance of impleader of the insurance company is criticized in Wright, Joinder of
Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MiNN. L. Ray. 580, 617 (1952).
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joinder of a liability or indemnity insurance company, unless such
company is by statute or contract liable to the person injured or
damaged.
°50
Not only does rule 14 permit a third person to be brought in against
his will, but also it is broader in scope than the "vouching in" process.
For example, in the warranty case mentioned above, the present
Washington cases do not seem to authorize the present procedure of
"vouching in" the supplier who is the third party. By general rule
"vouching in" is only authorized when it can be said that the third
party has some obligation to defend the suit. That obligation does not
seem to exist where, as in the above type of case, the third party is
not liable to the defendant for the very claim which might be estab-
lished against the original defendant." This limitation does not exist
under federal rule 14. It is only necessary that the original defendant
attempt to transfer all or part of his liability by asserting resulting
liability to him on the part of the third person."
In studying rule 14, several additional important points should be
kept in mind. It should be emphasized again that if defendant's claim
is against a co-party and a third party, defendant would make a cross-
claim against the co-party under proposed rule 13(g) and make a
motion to bring in the third party to answer the cross-claim." Rule
14 would apply only to a claim against "a person not a party to the
action."
The "impleader" procedure contemplated by the rule is not an
interpleader procedure. Interpleader is governed by proposed rule 22.
No Rule 38(c), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (1954).
51 The limitations of the "vouching-in" procedure are outlined in 1 FREEMAN, JUDG-
MENTS 981-984 (1925). It is usually held, for eample, that in a suit by a buyer against
a seller on a purely personal warranty of goods by the seller, the seller cannot bind his
supplier on the supplier's warranty to the seller by giving the supplier notice of the
suit of the buyer against the seller. Op. cit. supra at p. 983. In such a case there is no
liability on the part of the supplier for the claim per se of the buyer against the seller.
The Washington cases which have been found do not extend the procedure beyond
such a limitation. See Denny v. Sayward, 10 Wash. 422, 39 Pac. 119 (1894) (principal
and surety) ; Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 Pac. 572 (1901) (dictum; employer
and employee); Spokane v. Costello, 33 Wash. 98, 74 Pac. 58 (1903) (indemnity
agreement); American Bonding Co. v. Loeb, 47 Wash. 447, 92 Pac. 282 (1907) (prin-
cipal and surety); Kibler v. Maryland Casualty Co., 74 Wash. 159, 132 Pac. 878
(1913), (insured and insurer indemnifying insurer against loss); National Surety
Co. v. Fry Co., 86 Wash. 118, 149 Pac. 637 (1915) (indemnity bond); Cle Elum v.
Yeaman, 145 Wash. 157, 259 Pac. 35 (1927) (city and contractor liable over);
Abrahamson v. Burnett, 157 Wash. 668, 290 Pac. 228 (1930) (indemnity agreement);
Inashima v. Wardall, 128 Wash. 617, 224 Pac. 379 (1924) ; Seattle v. Saulez, 47 Wash.
365, 92 Pac. 140 (1907) (indemnity agreement); Seattle v. Reagan & Co., 52 Wash.
262, 100 Pac. 731 (1909) (indemnity agreement); East v. Fields, 42 Wn. 2d 924, 259
P.2d 639 (1953) (insured and insurer).
r2 See discussion in 3 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 417-419 (1948).
r3 See discussion of proposed rule 13.
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Although the bringing in of the third party as a party to the suit
might complicate the issues and the trial of a case, the court would
have the power to protect the parties against the inconvenience or
unfairness of one trial in particular cases by ordering separate trials
under proposed rule 42, discussed below.
Delay of plaintiff's action could result if impleader were granted;
but if it were shown that the plaintiff would be prejudiced unfairly by
delay, impleader could be refused. In considering the plaintiff's objec-
tion of delay it should be remembered that a second suit would be
eliminated.
Venue requirements present a problem. A few federal decisions have
held that venue requirements must be met, as to the third-party
defendant. The majority of federal cases hold that the third-party
complaint is ancillary and that venue requirements for original actions
are not applicable.54 The purpose of avoidance of multiplicity of suits
could not be as easily attained if venue objections were to be available
to the third-party defendant. Here again, however, the third party
would probably be able to assert venue objections if any applicable
venue requirements were jurisdictional.5
The rule spells out the rights of the third-party defendant, and also
sets forth the right of a plaintiff to bring in a third party when a coun-
terclaim is asserted against the plaintiff.
Proposed Rule 15
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or,
if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend
it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.
A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after
service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer,
unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
54 See discussion in 6 CYcLOPEDLA OF FEDERAL PROCEDUrE 94-96 (1951).
5 Federal diversity of citizenship requirements need not be met according to some
federal cases. 6 CYCLoPEDiA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE 90 (1951). It is arguable that
these cases would not be applicable to "jurisdictional venue" objections in a state court.
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in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the
merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,
or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading.
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court
may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit
him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the plead-
ing sought to be supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that
the adverse party plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time
therefor.
Proposed rule 15 would clearly replace most of the provisions of
rule 6 of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure and rules 2
and 3(1) of the General Rules of the Superior Courts. But generally,
the proposed rule would not make changes of any great importance
in present amendment practice. Both the present and proposed rules
contemplate liberality in allowance of amendments.
Leave to Amend; Time for Responsive Pleadings. At present the
plaintiff or defendant may amend once prior to answer or reply with-
out leave of court."0 This rule would be preserved with a modification
to provide for a time limit when no responsive pleading such as a reply
would be required."
The general time limit for a responsive pleading would be changed
from the present three-day limit."8 As at present, the court order could
contain a different time limit.
Grounds for Amendments. Except for trial amendments, the only
50 Rule 6(1), Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure; Rule 2, General Rules of
the Superior Courts, 34A Wn.2d.
57 A reply is required only in accordance with the terms of proposed rule 7.
68 Rule 3(1), General Rules of the Superior Courts, 34A Wn.2d.
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direction as to amendments is the provision that leave to amend shall
be "freely given when justice so requires." Although there are federal
cases to the contrary, this language has been interpreted by several
federal courts to mean that an amendment may introduce a new or
different cause of action which relates to the transaction or occurrence
that was the subject of the original complaint." On its face, present
rule 6(3) contains no limitation of amendments to include a new or
different cause of action.
The tests for allowance of amendments which are outlined in present
rule 6 (2) would be generally preserved.6" The trial court would retain
a wide discretion to grant or refuse leave to amend.6'
Under proposed rule 15(b), amendments that conform a complaint
to evidence not objected to at the trial would be treated as they are
now treated." The court also would be given discretion to allow
amendments to cover evidence to which there is an objection. Except
in one limited situation, this rule would do no more than grant the trial
court a discretion which it already has during the trial." Perhaps the
proposed rule directs greater liberality in this situation than is now
exercised by some trial courts.6"
Impact of Statutes of Limitations. Proposed rule 15(c) is intended
to indicate the circumstances under which a claim added by an
amendment would not be barred by an applicable statute of limitations.
In providing when such a claim would not be barred, it is somewhat
more specific in wording than present rule 6(4) of the Rules of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure. Under rule 6(4) the adverse
party must have been fairly apprised of the added cause of action
by the original pleading and that the plaintiff was claiming there-
59 See discussion in 3 MooRE, FEERA. PRACTICE 831-833 (1948).
603 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 833-836 (1948). A liberal attitude in favor of
allowance of amendment is indicated in many federal cases.
61 For a statement of the rule that a ruling will be reversed only for abuse of discre-
tion see Young v. Garrett, 159 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1947). Leading Washington cases
are Hendricks v. Hendricks, 35 Wn.2d 139, 211 P.2d 316 (1949) ; Palin v. General
Construction Co., 47 Wn.2d 246, 287 P.2d 325 (1955).
62 Rule 6(9), Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 34A Wn.2d (amendment
to conform to proof after trial). Kingwell v. Hart, 45 Wn.2d 401, 275 P.2d 431(1954), and Flagg v. Flagg, 192 Wash. 679, 74 P.2d 189 (1937), illustrate the rule that
the trial court should allow amendments to conform to proof or treat a pleading as
conformed to the proof.
63 In Ikola v. Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co., 12 Wn2d 341, 121 P.2d 369 (1942),
the court held that the trial court could not consider a pleading which did not state a
cause of action conformed to evidence which was not within the pleading and to which
there were objections, when defendant had properly challenged the complaint.
64 See discussion of the operation of the second part of rule 15(b) in 3 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 848-849 (1948).
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under." Under proposed subdivision (b) it is assumed that this
notice exists when the added claim relates to the conduct, transaction
or occurrence mentioned in the complaint.
In many jurisdictions an amendment setting forth a "new cause
of action" will not relate back to the original pleading. The federal
rule adopts this general approach but uses broader language."
Other Changes in Present Law. Subdivision (5), (6) and (7) of
present rule 6 are not covered by the proposed rule." If they are
considered necessary or desirable, they should be retained in the
court rules.
Supplemental Pleadings. In present practice a supplemental plead-
ing is permitted to show facts which occur after an original pleading
is filed." Subdivision (d) incorporates a similar rule and probably
would not expand the present scope of supplemental pleadings.
Proposed Rule 16
PtE-TRL4L PROCEDURES; FORMULATING IssuEs
This rule is already in effect as present rule 16.
Proposed Rule 17
PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT: CAPACITY
(a) Real Party in Interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest; but an executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose
name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in his own name without joining with
him the party for whose benefit the action is brought [; and when a
statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or bene-
fit of another shall be brought in the name of the United States].
(b) Reserved. [Capacity to Sue or be Sued. The capacity of an
individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or
be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capacity
of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under
which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district court
is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated associa-
GG Thus in Gilmour v. Longmire, 10 Wn2d 511, 117 P.2d 187 (1941), plaintiff
brought suit on a note lost or stolen, by a complaint in the usual form of a complaint
on a promissory note. It was held this complaint did not fairly apprise defendant of a
proposed amendment to set up a cause of action on an open account with respect to
which the originally alleged note had been given. The cause of action on the account
was barred by the time the leave for amendment Nwas sought.66 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcicE 850-856 (1948).




tion, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or
be sued in its common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against
it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) that the capacity of a receiver appointed by a
court of the United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United
States is governed by Title 28, U. S. C., § 754 and 949 (a).]
(c) Infants or Incompetent Persons. This rule does not affect
statutes and rules concerning the capacity of infants and incompetents
to sue or be sued. [Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a
representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or
other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of
the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person
does not have a duly appointed representative he may sue by his next
friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian
ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented
in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the
protection of the infant or incompetent person.]
Subdivision (a) merely restates the language of RCW 4.08.010 and
RCW 4.08.020 without any important change in meaning." It appears
that various related statutes would be unaffected."0
Subdivision (b) of the federal rule concerns a problem of choice of
law in a federal case and is properly omitted from the proposed rule.
Subdivision (c) of the federal rule is necessarily very general and
somewhat vague in comparison with RCW 4.08.050 and RCW
4.08.060."' Therefore, the proposal to retain our present rules on this
subject seems desirable. In some areas these present rules are not
satisfactory in practical operation, but this subject is a matter for a
separate and independent study. This subject is not of any importance
in the general structure of the federal party rule system.
Proposed Rule 18
JOINDER OF CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
(a) Joinder of Claims. The plaintiff in his complaint or in a
reply setting forth a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer set-
ting forth a counterclaim may join either as independent or as alter-
69 "Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except
as is otherwise provided by law." RCW 4.08.010. "An executor or administrator, or
guardian of a minor or person of unsound mind, a trustee of an express trust, or a
person authorized by statute, may sue without joining the person for whose benefit the
suit is prosecuted. A trustee of an express trust, within the meaning of this section,
shall be construed to include a person with whom or in whose name a contract is made
for the benefit of another." RCW 4.08.020.70o RCW 4.08.080 (suit by assignee); RCW 4.20.010 (wrongful death actions);
RCW 4.24 (various special rights of action).
71 These sections outline the procedure for appointment of a guardian ad litem.
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nate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may
have against an opposing party. There may be a like joinder of claims
when there are multiple parties if the requirements of Rules 19, 20
and 22 are satisfied. There may be a like joinder of cross-claims or
third-party claims if the requirements of Rule 13 and 14 respectively
are satisfied.
(b) Joinder of Remedies; Fraudulent Conveyances. Whenever a
claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been
prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single
action; but the court shall grant relief in that action only in accordance
with the relative substantive rights of the parties. In particular, a
plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a
conveyance fraudulent as to him, without first having obtained a judg-
ment establishing the claim for money.
Subdivision (b) is now rule 18 of the Washington Rules of Plead-
ing, Practice and Procedure.7 1
Subdivision (a) of the proposed rule would make a very important
change in present Washington law. The present controlling statute,
RCW 4.36.150, would be abrogated. 3 Enacted in 1854, this statute
is similar to the New York Field Code provision of 1848 as amended
in 1852.' 4 In specifying actions which may be joined it sets up cate-
gories of actions which the framers of the Field Code in 1848 and
1852 apparently felt could be conveniently joined. Then it sets forth
the troublesome provision that in multiple party suits the causes of
action which may be joined as set forth in the statute must affect
all of the parties to the action. This later provision is dealt with in
the discussion of proposed rule 20.
Underlying the proposed rule in part is the premise that the present
statutory categories of actions which may be joined are somewhat
arbitrary in nature. For example, the statute allows actions on express
72 34A Wn.2d.
73 "The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when
they all arise out of,-
(1) Contract, express or implied; or(2) Injuries, with or without force, to the person; or
(3) Injuries, with or without force, to property; or
(4) Injuries, to character; or
(5) Claims to recover real property, with or without damages for the withholding
thereof; or(6) Claims to recover personal property, with or without damages for the with-
holding thereof; or(7) Claims against a trustee, by virtue of a contract or by operation of law.
(8) The same transaction.
But the causes of action so uited must affect all the parties to the action, and not
require different places of trial, and must be separately stated." RCW 4.36.150.




or implied contract to be joined although there may not be the slight-
est relation between the joined actions in fact and in law. But when
a plaintiff has a contract action and a tort action against a defendant
and the actions have no relation in law or fact, he cannot join the
actions in one complaint. At the same time actions which are related
because they arose out of the same transaction may be joined, although
they may or may not have related issues."
On the other hand, the proposed rule is drafted on the basis that
whether joinder of particular causes will complicate and confuse a
trial or prejudice a defendant often depends upon individual situations
which cannot be adequately categorized by any general pleading rules.
It takes the truly practical approach that the allowance of joinder of
actions should depend upon trial convenience and fairness and not
upon regulation by general rule of what actions may be joined in the
complaint at the pleading stage.
On the basis of this theory the framers of rule 18 placed no restric-
tion on joinder of causes of action at the pleading stage except for
restrictions as to parties in proposed rules 19 and 20. However, there
is protection against a "free-for-all fight." Under proposed rule 42,
the trial judge would be given the discretion to order separate trials
if a joint trial of claims would be unduly complicated or prejudicial
to the defendant."' Thus the overall affect of this rule plus proposed
rule 42 is to provide a treatment for joinder of actions based on perti-
nent considerations in individual cases (subject to the rules for joinder
of parties in multiple party cases). After ten years of experience with
the rule in Colorado, it was said that the rule had worked well in the
opinion of the bench and bar of that stateY.7
The prior discussion of alternative allegations applies generally to
the provision of this rule for joinder of claims in the alternative."'
Of course, the rule is merely permissive in effect.
Again, this rule would not affect venue or jurisdiction. Defendant
could still make any appropriate venue or jurisdictional objections to
any of the claims joined under the rule.7
In multiple party suits in which several causes of action are joined,
the requirements of rules 19 and 20 would be decisive and might limit
7-5 See further discussion in CLARx, CODE PLEADING 442 (1947).
76 See discussion of proposed rule 42.
77 Groves, Parties, Rules 17-25, 23 RocKY MT. L. REv. 552, 554 (1951).
7S Meisenholder, The Effect of Proposed Rules 7 through 25 on Present Washington
Procedures, 32 WASH. L. Rlv. 219, 237-238 (1957).
79 See discussion of jurisdiction and venue problems in the federal courts in 3
MooRE, FEDERA. PaAcnlcE 1814-1819 (1948).
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joinder of causes of action. But rule 18 alone would have no limiting
effect. This matter will be discussed further in connection with the
following rules governing multiple parties.
Proposed Rule 19
NEcissARY JonDmR oF PARTIES
(a) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and
of subdivision (b) of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be
made parties and be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.
When a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff.
(b) Effect of Failure to Join. When persons who are not indis-
pensable, but who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded
between those already parties, have not been made parties and are
subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to both service of process and
venue [ and can be made parties without depriving the court of juris-
diction of the parties before it], the court shall order them summoned
to appear in the action. The court in its discretion may proceed in the
action without making such persons parties, if its jurisdiction over
them as to either service of process or venue can be acquired only by
their consent or voluntary appearance [or if, though they are subject
to its jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive the court of jurisdiction
of the parties before it] ; but the judgment rendered therein does not
affect the rights or liabilities of absent persons.
(c) Same: Names of Omitted Persons and Reasons for Non-
Joinder to be Pleaded. In any pleading in which relief is asked, the
pleader shall set forth the names, if known to him, of persons who
ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between those
already parties, but who are not joined, and shall state why they are
omitted.
This rule and proposed rule 20 contemplate a classification of parties
which is not established by the present Washington cases. Parties
would be classified as "indispensable," "necessary" (or "conditionally
necessary"), and "proper." Indispensable parties are those persons
without whom the action may not proceed. Necessary parties are those
persons without whom the action may not proceed unless they cannot
be brought within the jurisdiction of the court. Proper parties are
those who may be joined but need not be joined as indispensable or
necessary parties. Rule 19 governs the joinder of indispensable parties
and of necessary parties; rule 20 governs the joinder of proper
parties.8 0




The present Washington law defining parties who must be joined
is theoretically in a state of uncertainty. Prior to 1943 the governing
rule was contained in the usual code pleading provision that parties
united in interest must be joined.8' For some reason this statute was
then repealed, and there now is no specific governing statute or court
rule. 2 However, unless a future case indicates otherwise, the court
will probably follow decisions under the former statute. These deci-
sions seem to classify parties as "necessary" or "proper." No decision
has been discovered which distinguishes between "indispensable" and
"necessary" parties as contemplated by proposed rule 19.83 This dis-
tinction would thus be new in Washington practice.
Under proposed rule 19, "indispensable" parties would include most
of the types of parties who must now be joined as necessary parties
under the present Washington decisions, and for this reason it appears
that this rule would make little change in present compulsory joinder
rules except as indicated below. For example, joint obligees are neces-
sary plaintiffs in a suit on the obligation under Washington law; they
are indispensable parties who must be joined under the proposed rule."'
A joint tortfeasor would not be an indispensable or a necessary defend-
ant under rule 19; he is not a necessary defendant under present
Washington law. 5 The Washington rule concerning necessary joinder
of husband and wife would probably continue.8 6
A question of some importance is presented by RCW 4.28.190, which
provides for suit against all the persons such as partners who are
jointly indebted upon a contract, but further authorizes service on
only one or more of such persons. If service of process is had on less
81 Rem. Rev. Stat. § 189.82 Wash. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 206, § 1. RCW 4.08.130 provides that the court shall
cause persons to be brought into a suit when a complete determination of a controversy
cannot be had without their presence. This statute is sometimes referred to as provid-
ing a rule for determination of necessary parties, but it furnishes relatively little guid-
ance in this respect. Originally it was probably intended to supplement the repealed
statute.
83 RCW 4.28.190, which is mentioned later in the text, treats joint obligors in a
manner somewhat similar to the treatment of "necessary" parties under subdivision (b)
of the proposed rule.
s4 Dew v. Pearson, 73 Wash. 602, 132 Pac. 412 (1913), discussed in Henson v. First
Security & Loan Co., 164 Wash. 198, 2 P.2d 85 (1931) ; Seltzer v. Chadwick, 26 Wn.2d
297, 173 P.2d 991 (1946). A leading case under the federal rule is Freman v. NV. A.
Schaeffer Pen Co., 111 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.Ia. 1953), affirmed 209 F.2d 627 (8th Cir.
1954).
S85 Abb. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954 (1902) (dictum).
Under federal rule 19, joint tort feasors are not usually considered indispensable or
necessary parties. Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1942). However, some
federal cases treat joint tort feasors as necessary parties under the rule. See for
example Edwards v. Rogers, 120 F. Supp. 499 (E.D.S.C. 1954).
86 See RCW 4.08.030.
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than all joint obligors, judgment may still be had against the joint
property of all as well as the individuals served with process."
Would this statute be abrogated? An argument could be made that
ordinarily under the federal rule joint obligors are necessary as dis-
tinguished from indispensable parties in the sense that all must be
joined except for those who cannot be properly served with process."8
This result is inconsistent with the statute, which would therefore be
abrogated. However, it might also be urged that the present statute
is supplementary to the proposed rule. The supreme court would
undoubtedly settle this matter when the rules were promulgated by
listing this statute as abrogated if it is inconsistent with proposed
rule 19.
Subdivision (b) deals with necessary parties. Under this rule the
parties who are necessary but not indispensable would be those parties
who should be present to settle all the issues in the suit. At the same
time the case must be of such a nature that an order only as to the
actual parties would not injure the absent necessary party nor the
actual parties."s Although it is not restricted to such cases, this con-
cept of necessary parties is most often applied in equity-type cases
and embodies a general equity rule of procedure followed in many
states, as well as the rule in some code pleading states.90
Subdivision (c) provides that if parties are necessary but are not
joined, the complaint must explain why they are not joined.
The provision of subdivision (a) that a party who refuses to join
as plaintiff may be made a defendant is similar to a provision of the
former Washington statute concerning joinder of necessary parties.9'
The provision that a person may be made an involuntary plaintiff
(when he must be joined) would be new. In federal courts its use has
8 7 
"When the action is against two or more defendants and the summons is served
on one or more but not on all of them, the plaintiff may proceed as follows:(1) If the action is against the defendants jointly indebted upon a contract, he may
proceed against the defendants served unless the court otherwise directs; and
if he recovers judgment it may be entered against all the defendants thusjointly indebted so far only as it may be enforced against the joint property of
all and the separate property of the defendants served.
(2) If the action is against defendants severally liable, he may proceed against the
defendants served in the same manner as if they were the only defendants.
(3) Though all the defendants may have been served with the summons, judgment
may be taken against any of them severally, when the plaintiff would be en-
titled to judgment against such defendants if the action had been against them
alone."
88 See cases cited in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrscE 2169-2170 (1948).
89 The cases are reviewed in the standard treatises on the rules.
00 The general rule is discussed in 67 C.J.S. 970 (1950).91 Rem. Rev. Stat. § 189.
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been restricted to patent and copyright cases in which such a person
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. 2
If a person who had not been joined were an indispensable party,
the defect in the suit would be challenged by motion to dismiss, by
answer, or at a later time in the suit.93 When objection was raised the
court could permit amendment of the complaint and proper service
of the indispensable party if that could be had.9 Although the rule
is uncertain in Washington, it is arguable that this general method of
handling nonjoinder is also now authorized.9
Proposed Rule 20
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action as
plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the
alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of
law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action. All persons
may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact
common to all of them will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant
need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief
demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs
according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more
defendants according to their respective liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as will pre-
vent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to expense by
the inclusion of a party against whom he asserts no claim and who
asserts no claim against him, and may order separate trials or make
other orders to prevent delay or prejudice.
This rule is intended to define "proper" parties-parties who may
be joined but who need not be joined. It is apparent that a some-
what liberal party joinder practice is contemplated.
Two requisites are laid down for permissive joinder of both plain-
tiffs and defendants. First, except as qualified at the end of this
discussion of rule 20, the rights to relief of plaintiffs, and the rights
of relief asserted against defendants, must relate to or arise out of
92 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTcE 2147-2150 (1948). The meaning of this provision
is not at all clear.
93 See proposed rule 12.94 Warner v. First National Bank of Minneapolis, 236 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1956), and
cases cited therein. See also discussion of proposed rule 21.
V5 See discussion of proposed rule 21.
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the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences. 6 Second, a question of law and of fact which is common to
all of the parties must arise in the suit. This latter condition does
not mean that all of the questions of fact and law must be common
to all of the parties, nor that the common question or questions of law
and fact must affect the parties joined in the same way."
The present Washington law concerning permissive joinder of plain-
tiffs would not be changed. Rule 2 (1) of the Rules of Pleading, Prac-
tice and Procedure, which governs permissive joinder of plaintiffs, is
almost exactly the same as the proposed rule. 8
A question of whether rule 2 (1) is now fully effective has been raised
in a prior issue of the Washington Law Review. 9 This question is
whether the present rule abrogates the requirement of the present
joinder of causes of action statute that all causes of action united must
affect all of the parties to the action.' Although dictum indicates that
the statute may still be effective, actual decisions under the rule indi-
cate that the statutory requirement is abrogated. 1' This result seems
well established; but if there is such a problem it would be settled, and
the statute would be clearly abrogated by this proposed rule together
with proposed rule 18. All causes of action in multiple party suits
would not have to affect all plaintiffs as now contemplated by the
statute.
Permissive joinder of defendants is now governed to a limited extent
by rule 2(2) of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, which
00 See discussion cited in footnote 14.
17 The right to relief may affect the multiple parties (plaintiffs or defendants)
"jointly, severally or in the alternative."
98 "(1) All persons may be joined in one action, as plaintiffs, in whom any right to
relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same transaction or series of transactions, is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, where, if such persons
brought separate actions, any common question of law or fact would arise: Provided,
That if, upon the application of any party, it shall appear that such joinder would
embarrass or delay the trial of the action, the court may order separate trials or make
such other order as may be expedient, and judgment may be given for such one or
more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for the relief to which he
or they may be entitled." Rule 2(1), Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 34A
Wn.2d.
09 Note, 25 WASH. L. Rav. 92-93 (1950).
100 RCW 4.36.150.
101 In Lamb v. Mason, 26 Wn.2d 879, 176 P.2d 342 (1947), the court said in dictum
that a plaintiff could not sue individually for her own injuries and for wrongful death
in the same suit. However, the decisions on the facts in following cases indicate that
the statutory requirement is abrogated: Karnes v. Flint, 153 Wash. 225, 279 Pac. 728
(1929); Koboski v. Cobb, 161 Wash. 574, 297 Pac. 771 (1931). See also dictum in
State ex rel United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Superior Court, 195 Wash. 426, 81




authorizes joinder of defendants in the alternative as outlined in the
rule." 2 This rule is continued by the proposed rule.0 3
At present, unless rule 2 (2) applies in a particular case, defendants
must be affected by all of the causes of action joined in the suit." 4 This
statutory rule would be abrogated as to defendants by the proposed
rule. Abolition of this statutory rule is one of the most important
changes that proposed rules 19 and 20 would make in the present per-
missive joinder rules.
Another statute now provides that persons severally liable on an
instrument may be joined in a suit on the instrument in accordance
with the desires of the plaintiff.' This rule would be continued under
the proposed rules unless persons liable on the instrument would be
"necessary" parties under proposed rule 19 in particular cases.
The common code pleading provision covering the joinder of per-
missive defendants is not contained in our statutes.' Some of the pres-
ent case law results would be changed; other results would not be. But
generally speaking the present, sometimes vague, case law tests for
permissive joinder would be abandoned. For example, joint tort-
feasors are now proper parties and may be joined as defendants.
This case law is merely a continuation of a common law rule under
the codes.'07 Under the proposed rule joint tortfeasors are proper
parties because the cause of action against them involves the same
transaction or occurrence and some common question of fact and law.'
The proposed rule will not change substantive law, however. Thus
102 "(2) Where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled
to redress, he may join two or more defendants to the intent that the question as to
which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as
between the parties." Rule 2(2), Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 34A
Wn.2d.103 Joinder in the alternative is specifically mentioned by the proposed rule.
104 Bank of California v. American Fruit Growers, 4 Wn.2d 186, 103 P.2d 27 (1940).
205 RCW 4.08.090.
1"06 The usual code provision states, "Any person may be made a defendant who has
or claims an interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary
party to a complete determination, or settlement of the questions involved therein."
PomERoy, CODE REMEniEs 303 (5th ed. 1929).
107 POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 342 (5th ed. 1929).
103 In Snavely v. Goldendale, 10 Wn.2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941), plaintiff sued for
damages resulting from alleged pollution of a stream. The court held it was proper tojoin as defendants a city on the ground that it was taking private property by its
sewage disposal and a meat packing plant on the ground that it was creating a nui-
sance. The court said that under code pleading rules parties contributing to a common
injury may be joined. It also cited rule 2(2) as a ground for joinder. Under proposed
rule 20 in a somewhat simliar case, a federal court held that claims against two differ-
ent industrial companies for damages for emission of fumes from their factories could
not be joined because they did not involve the same transaction or occurrence or series
of transactions or occurrences, but it ordered a joint trial under federal rule 42. Stan-




it is arguable that at present a liability insurer who engages to pay
losses for which the insured is legally liable is not liable directly for
injuries caused by the insured as a matter of substantive law. If such
a conclusion is correct, the insurer cannot be joined with the insured
at present, and the insurer could not be so joined under the proposed
rule."' Of course, if an insurer were directly liable to the person
injured by law or agreement with the insured, the insurer could be
joined under the proposed rule just as it can be joined at present.11
Only a short reference can be made to an important problem under
the rule which has been discussed in detail elsewhere." 1 Under rules
18 and 20 it would be proper to join two unrelated claims against all
of two or more joint defendants. But could a claim against all multiple
defendants be joined with an unrelated claim against part of the mul-
tiple defendants? One position (supported by the majority of federal
cases) is that rule 20 prohibits such a joinder because the two claims
do not relate to the same transaction or series of transactions. The
opposing position is that the rule does not require both of such claims
to relate to the same transaction. Under present state law, such a
joinder is not possible because each defendant is not affected by both
of the causes of action.
Subdivision (b) of the proposed rule merely ensures that the gen-
eral rule embodied in proposed rule 42 will be applied in cases where
proper parties are joined. It also authorizes additional measures to
afford protection against a "free-for-all."
Proposed Rule 21
MIsJOINDER AND NoN-JonDER OF PARTIES
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party
or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
100 Keseleff v. Sunset Highway Motor Frt. Co., 187 Wash. 642, 60 P.2d 720 (1936)
(agreement to pay any final judgment) ; Mitchell v. Cadwell, 188 Wash. 257, 62 P.2d
41 (1936) (same), are somewhat pertinent but no case exactly in point has been dis-
covered. Under the proposed rule in Colorado the court held that under a similar
policy joinder of the insurance company was not authorized by the proposed rule.
Crowley v. Hardman Bros., 122 Colo. 489, 223 P.2d 1045 (1950) ; Wheat v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 128 Colo. 236, 261 P.2d 493 (1953). See cases cited therein. However,
when the policy obligated the insurance company to pay "by reason of the liability
imposed upon him [the insured] by law for damages," the Colorado court held that the
defendant insured could be impleaded by defendent insurer under proposed rule 14.
Pioneer Mutual Compensation Co. v. Cosby, 125 Colo. 468, 244 P.2d 1089 (1952). See
footnotes 46-50 and related discussion.
220 Devoto v. United Auto Transportation Co., 128 Wash. 604, 223 Pac. 1050
(1924) ; see Note, 20 A.L.R.2d 1097 (1951).
111 Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 MINN.
L. REv. 580, 604-611 (1952).
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are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with
separately.
This rule is based on the idea that a defect in parties should have a
minimum effect upon the final disposition of the suit.
Since misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal under the
proposed rule, an objection to such misjoinder would not be made by
a motion to dismiss or a defense in the answer. The objection would
be made by a motion to drop the party who is misjoined or to sever
his claim or the claim asserted against him.1 2
At present misjoinder of parties is not a ground for a demurrer."'
Presumably the majority code pleading rule now governs. This rule
is that misjoinder of plaintiffs and defendants must be reached by a
motion to dismiss or drop such persons."" Also, a demurrer on the
ground of misjoinder of causes of action may now be used if each cause
of action in a suit does not affect all of the parties." 5
The mechanics of objecting to nonjoinder of indispensable parties
are not specifically covered by this rule. Such an objection would be
taken by motion to dismiss or by answer. If such an objection were
successful, the plaintiff could be granted the right to amend in case
of nonjoinder if it were possible to make the missing person a party to
the suit." 6 At present it appears that a similar method of handling
the matter is authorized."'
Rule 2(3) of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure would
thus be replaced.
Necessary parties as classified under the federal rule may be added
as parties. Rule 19(b) is also pertinent in this connection. Proper
parties could also be added under this rule.
U2 2 BARuoN and HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL, PRACTICE AND PROCEURE 117-118 (1950).
1aS Estes v. Brewster Cigar Co., 156 Wash. 465, 287 Pac. 36 (1930).
"14 1 BANCROFT, CODE PLEADING 341-342 (1926). This sort of motion appears to be
contemplated by rule 2(3) of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, 34A
Wn.2d.
115 Hames v. Spokane-Benton County Natural Gas Co., 118 Wash. 156, 203 Pac. 18
(1922), is an example of such a use of a demurrer.
If the defendant now takes the position that no cause of action is stated against him,
although it may be against his joint defendants, he should be able to demur on the
ground that no cause of action is stated against him.
116 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2205 (1948).
117 A demurrer may now be made for nonjoinder apparent on the face of the com-
plaint. A nonjoinder objection not apparent on the face of the complaint may be
pleaded in the answer. Whether plaintiff will be allowed to amend is not clear. The
cases which hold that a court should order a necessary party to be joined seem to
furnish authority for permission to plaintiff to amend and include such a party. See
Toulouse v. New York Life Ins. Co., 39 Wn.2d 439, 235 P.2d 1003 (1951) ; Automo-
bile Club of Washington v. Seattle, 49 Wn.2d. 262, 300 P.2d 577 (1956), and cases
cited therein. See also Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v. G. P. Halferty & Co., 44





This rule is already in effect as present rule 22.
Proposed Rule 23
CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of
all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right
sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of
a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought.
(b) Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action brought to
enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in
an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association
refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the
complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plain-
tiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he com-
plains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law
[and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of
the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not other-
wise have jurisdiction]. The complaint shall also set forth with par-
ticularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing
directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such
action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such
action or the reasons for not making such effort.
(c) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought
to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of
this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the
right is one defined by paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice
shall be given only if the court requires it.
Class actions are now authorized by RCW 4.08.070 "when the
question is one of common or general interest to many persons, or
where the parties are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them
all before the court." Some state courts have interpreted this statute
to mean that there are two alternative requirements for a class suit;
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others have held that a class suit is authorized only if there is a common
or general question and if the parties are numerous and it is imprac-
ticable to bring them all in."' There is no Washington decision on
this question, although the rule as stated in various opinions is con-
sistent with the latter interpretation mentioned above." ' Proposed
rule 23(a) (1) and (2) would settle this question and adopt the latter
viewpoint.
With this possible qualification, these subdivisions generally embody
the rules for class actions which are contained in our code provision.
There are not many Washington supreme court opinions concerning
challenges to class actions, but it appears that in every discovered case
in which such an action was challenged and upheld, the action would
have been a class action under proposed subdivisions (a) (1) and
(2) . °1 In cases in which a class action was held improper at least in
part by our court, it is probable that there would not have been a
proper class action under these subdivisions."'
However, subdivision (3) would authorize what is termed a "spuri-
ous class action," which is not authorized in Washington at present.
The term "spurious" is used because the action authorized would not
have the attributes of our present class actions. It is essentially a per-
missive joinder device which authorizes a number of separate claims
to be joined. This is made clear by the fact that it has been held in
federal court that a judgment in such an action is conclusive only upon
persons who become parties to the suit and are actually before the
court."' The standard example of such an action is a suit by some
property owners of a larger group whose property has been damaged
118 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 399, note 214 (1947).
;L9 For example, in Lew You Ying v. Lew Kay, 174 Wash. 83, 24 P.2d 596 (1933),
the court held the plaintiff could bring a representative action because "the question is
one of common or general interest to many persons, and it is impractical to bring them
all before the court."
120 See the following cases: State ex rel. Cannery Workers and Farm Laborers
Union v. Superior Court, 30 Wn.2d 697, 193 P.2d 362 (1948) (suit by member of un-
incorporated association); Fahrenwald v. Spokane Savings Bank, 179 Wash. 61, 35
P.2d 1117 (1934) (suit by shareholder of savings and loan society) ; Lew You Ying v.
Lew Kay, 174 Wash. 83, 24 P.2d 596 (1933) (suit to quiet title by alleged heir) ;
Hames v. Spokane-Benton County Natural Gas Co., 118 Wash. 156, 203 Pac. 18
(1922) (stockholders' representative action) ; Perkins & Co. v. Diking District No. 3,
162 Wash. 227, 298 Pac. 462 (1931) (suit by bondholder against diking commissioners
for mandatory injunction to require collection of unpaid taxes for payment of district
bonds); Coleman v. Rathbun, 40 Wash. 303, 82 Pac. 540 (1905) (suit to restrain
enforcement of assessment liens) ; Clay v. Selah Valley Irrigation Co., 14 Wash. 543,
45 Pac. 141 (1896).
123 Elston v. King County, 178 Wash. 210, 34 P.2d 906 (1934) ; South Seattle Land
Co. v. King County, 183 Wash. 284, 48 P.2d 251 (1935); Vashon Fruit Union v.
Godwin & Co., 87 Wash. 384, 151 Pac. 797 (1915).122 See discussion in 3 MoorE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE 3442-3455 (1948).
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by a spreading fire started by the alleged negligence of the defendant."'
Subdivision (b) has been subject to some criticism. It has been
argued that the requirement that plaintiff aver his status as a stock-
holder at the time of the transaction of which he complains is a sub-
stantive rule of law and not a procedural rule.2 4 This has not been
the usual ruling in federal cases." 5 The rule expressed is the rule now
in force in this state by case law.'
The last sentence of subdivision (b) is not substantive and is con-
sistent with dictum in a Washington case."'
Finally, a complaint in a class action would have to indicate that the
suit meets the requirements of rule 23.128 Therefore, proposed rule 9,




(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute [of the
United States] confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2)
when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties
is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a
judgment in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the
court or an officer thereof.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute [of the
United States] confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when
an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question
of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground
of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered
by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regu-
lation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to
the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely applica-
123 Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.Pa. 1947) (dictum).
124 3 AooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3493-3502 (1948).
'125 Kaufman v. Wolfson, 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See cases cited in
3 Moopx, FEDERAL PRACTICE 3496-3497 (1948).
11 Davis v. Harrison, 25 Wn.2d 1, 167 P.2d 1015 (1946), and cases cited. The
opinion states there is an exception to the rule "only in cases in which the wrongful
acts were effectually concealed, and it appeared that the effects of the mismanagement
continued to the stockholder's injury."
-127 In Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wn.2d 748, 144 P.2d 725 (1944), it was said that
the stockholder should show he "has exhausted all his available means to obtain within
the corporation itself redress of his grievances or the institution of an action in con-
fornuity with his wishes..."
128 See cases cited and text in 2 BENDER, FEDERAL PRACTICE FoRms 533-535 (1956).
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tion may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its dis-
cretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion
to intervene upon all parties affected thereby. The motion shall state
the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting
forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. [The same
procedure shall be followed when a statute of the United States gives
a right to intervene. When the constitutionality of an act of Congress
affecting the public interest is drawn in question in any action to which
the United States or an officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a
party, the court shall notify the Attorney General of the United States
as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 2403.]
Subdivision (a) is a more specific restatement of the intervention
rule now embodied in RCW 4.08.190. Subdivision (b) would permit
a type of intervention which is not now authorized, and therefore it
would inaugurate a more liberal intervention practice than is now in
effect.
Under our present statute, a person can intervene and become a
party in a suit if he "has an interest in the matter in litigation in the
success of either party, or an interest against both." '129 In substance
this means that a person may intervene in a suit if he will gain or lose
by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.Y3 0 In most
cases persons who have a right to intervene under the present statute
are also proper parties under Washington cases defining persons who
may join or be joined in a suit. On the other hand it would seem that
some proper parties do not have the right to intervene at present."'
These tests do not authorize intervention merely because the inter-
venor's claim or defense has a question of law or fact in common with
the main action. This test of permissive intervention under subdivi-
sion (b) means that the applicant for intervention would not need to
have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of litiga-
tion, and would not need to be a person who would have been a proper
party at the beginning of the suit.' A typical case for permissive
19 RCW 4.08.200.
130 State v. Roff, 178 Wash. 311, 34 P.2d 899 (1934).
131 Where two persons are injured in the same accident, both might join to sue the
defendant under rule 2 of the Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure. This matter
is in some doubt. See footnote 99 and related discussion. However, if one begins a
suit against defendant, the other now has no right to intervene. The judgment would
not have any legal operation or effect on the injured person who has not joined in such
a suit.
13 Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty and Improvement
Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940), is a leading case.
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intervention would involve an applicant who has a claim against
defendant which is similar to that asserted by the plaintiff. The
Washington case, Hutteball v. Montgomery,' furnishes another excel-
lent illustration. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, M, to recover
for injuries incurred in an automobile collision. M's wife lost her life
in the accident and M was appointed administrator of her estate.
As such administrator he attempted to intervene to recover against
plaintiffs for the wrongful death of his wife in the accident. Inter-
vention was properly refused under the Washington statute. However,
under subdivision (b) of the proposed rule it appears that it would be
within the discretion of the trial court to allow intervention.
The intervention procedure outlined in subdivision (c) would not
raise any difficulties.
Our present statute provides for intervention prior to trial, whereas




(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court [within 2 years after the death] may order substitution of the
proper parties. [If substitution is not so made, the action shall be
dismissed as to the deceased party.] The motion for substitution may
be made by the successors or representatives of the deceased party or
by any party and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be served
on the parties as provided [in Rule 5,] by statute for service of notices,
and upon persons not parties in the manner provided [in Rule 4] by
statute for the service of a summons [, and may be served in any judi-
cial district]. If substitution is not nwde within a reasonable time, the
action way be dismissed as to the deceased party.
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or of
one or more of the defendants in an action in which the right sought to
be enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the
surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The death shall be
suggested upon the record and the action shall proceed in favor of or
against the surviving parties.
(b) Incompetency. If a party becomes incompetent, the court upon
motion served as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule may allow
the action to be continued by or against his representative.
133 187 Wash. 407, 60 P2d 80 (1936).
184 Under the proposed rule intervention could be disallowed if not requested before
trial, but if a strong showing of necessity and excuse for lack of earlier action is made,
it might be allowed even after judgment. See 2 BARRoN and HoLTZOFF, FEDmAL PRAc-
TICE AND PRocEDuRE 206-209 (1950).
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(c) Transfer of Interest. In case of any transfer of interest, the
action may be continued by or against the original party unless the
court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is trans-
ferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party.
Service of the motion shall be made as provided in subdivision (a) of
this rule.
(d) Reserved. [Public Officers; Death or Separation from Office.
When an officer of the United States, or of the District of Columbia,
the Canal Zone, a territory, an insular possession, a state, county,
city, or other governmental agency, is a party to an action and during
its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action
may be continued and maintained by or against his successor, if within
6 months after the successor takes office it is satisfactorily shown to
the court that there is a substantial need for so continuing and main-
taining it. Substitution pursuant to this rule may be made when it is
shown by supplemental pleading that the successor of an officer adopts
or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his prede-
cessor in enforcing a law averred to be in violation of the Constitution
of the United States. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer
to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reason-
able notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to
object.]
This rule is the least important of the proposed rules. Subdivision
(a) (1) of the proposed rule embodies an unadopted amendment pro-
posed by the former Advisory Committee of the United States
Supreme Court and does not embody the present federal rule, which
is indicated above by the material in brackets.'
It has been said that this subdivision of the present federal rule
is the least satisfactory of all of the federal rules. Its effect is not
clear because it may be a substantive limitation rule. 8 ' The proposed
rule, however, is not such a limitation rule.
The present governing statute provides that an action shall not
abate by the death, marriage or other disability of a party or by the
transfer of any interest in the action if the cause of action survives
or continues. The court may at any time within one year, on motion,
allow the action to be continued by or against representatives or suc-
cessors in interest."' In and of itself this section does not describe
what actions will not abate by death, etc.
Likewise, proposed rule 25 does not specify what actions shall abate
185 Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts, 22-23 (1955).




or survive. It is merely a procedural rule which provides the methods
by which a suit may continue if the right of action survives or con-
tinues." 8
Thus the statute would be replaced by the proposed rule except
that the statute would still be effective as to abatement of an action
by marriage.
It is also arguable that the statute would remain effective as a sub-
stantive statute of limitations concerning substitution of parties.'
If the statutory limitation period of one year is considered substan-
tive, then the rule would mean that the substitution under subdivision
(a) could be refused even within a year. The statutory period of one
year could be shortened if substitution is not made within a reasonable
time under particular circumstances.'
Proposed Rule 42
SEPARATE TnmiAs: JUDGMMNTS
(a) Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims or
issues.
(b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When more than one claim
for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims only
upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the
claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims.
(c) Stay of Judgment Upon Multiple Claims. When a court has
ordered a final judgment on some but not all of the claims presented
in the action under the conditions stated in [Rule 54(b),] section (b)
of this rule the court may stay enforcement of that judgment until the
entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe
such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the
party in whose favor the judgment is entered.
Subdivision (a) of the proposed rule is federal rule 42 (b). Federal
138 Supra, note 135.
130 See Gordon v. Hillman, 109 Wash. 218, 186 P. 255 (1919).140 Supra, note 135.
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rule 42 (a), which deals with consolidation of actions, is not included."'
Subdivision (b) is federal rule 54(b). The remainder of federal rule
54, which deals with the effect of the demand for judgment on the
pleadings and with costs, is omitted."" The third subdivision of the
proposed rule is federal rule 62(h). The remainder of federal rule
62 contains miscellaneous provisions for stay of proceedings covering
situations not particularly related to multiple party cases or cases
involving multiple claims.'
The proposed rule therefore contains only those provisions from
the federal rules which give the trial court discretion to order separate
trials and render separate judgments in cases involving multiple claims
or parties. If the liberal rules for joinder of claims and parties, for
counterclaims, and for impleader of third persons are to be adopted,
it seems necessary to give the trial court the power to order separate
trials to avoid prejudice to parties in particular cases or to provide
for convenient and manageable trials. Separate trials could be ordered
for independent issues raised by original claims which are joined and
issues raised by counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims. 4'
Proposed rule 20(b) should be read with this rule.
However, the power of the court to order separate trials would not
be limited to cases involving joinder of multiple claims or parties.
Affirmative defenses, or preliminary issues which might decide the
entire suit, could be tried separately. The request for separate trial
141 "(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact
are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay." Federal rule 42.
342 "(a) Definition; Form. 'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and
any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment shall not contain a recital of plead-
ings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings."
"(c) Demand for Judgment. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind
from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to
a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
"(d) Costs. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of
the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing
party unless the court otherwise directs; but costs against the United States, its
officers, and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. Costs may
be taxed by the clerk on one day's notice. On motion served within 5 days thereafter,
the action of the clerk may be reviewed by the court" Federal rule 54.
143 The following headings of the subdivisions of federal rule 62 indicate its general
content. "(a) Automatic Stay; Exception-Injunctions, Receiverships, and Patent Ac-
countings; (b) Stay on Motion for New Trial or for Judgment; (c) Injunction Pend-
ing Appeal; (d) Stay Upon Appeal; (e) Stay in Favor of the United States or Agency
Thereof; (f) Stay According to State Law; (g) Power of Appellate Court Not
Limited." Federal rule 62.
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would be made after the pleadings were at issue."5
No general Washington statute now authorizes similar separate trials;
no definitive local case law on this subject has been found. However,
present rule 2(1), which governs joinder of plaintiffs, authorizes
separate trials when plaintiffs join pursuant to the rule.
The discretion to make separate judgments would be a necessary
and desirable concomitant of the power to order separate trials. The
proposed rule provides for an express direction for entry of a final
judgment to avoid in part questions as to whether a particular judg-
ment on one of several claims would be final." 6 A final judgment on
less than all of the claims in an action would not have to be made by
the trial court; but if it were made, if it were final as to the claims
affected, and if it were certified as final, it would be appealable under
the present rules for appeals from final judgments.'
The discretionary stay power mentioned in subdivision (c) would
be supplementary to the power to grant separate judgments.
At present the power to grant separate judgments is limited and
would not be sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the proposed
rule."
8
A question of whether there is a right to a jury trial would probably
not be affected by an order for separate trials. Generally speaking, it
appears that the present Washington law on this subject would be
applied to a case as made up in the pleading stage by the parties.
144 The granting of a separate trial is within the discretion of the trial court, but a
case should not be tried piecemeal unless necessary to avoid undue delay or avoid prej-
udice. See cases cited in 2 BARRON and HOLTzOFF, FEDEA. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
665-672 (1950). See the discussion of impleader of liability insurance companies under
proposed rule 14.
4' 2 BARRON and HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 665, 671 (1950).
148 However, the rule affects only multiple claim cases and is operative only forjudgments (concerning one or more but less than all of several claims in a case) which
are otherwise final (and not a partial adjudication) as to the claims affected. See
extended discussion of related questions in 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 208-226 (1953).
147 The rule is not intended to affect rules of appeal concerning interlocutory orders
of any kind. In multiple claim cases it would indicate affirmatively which judgments
on one or more of all claims would be final. Judgments disposing of such a claim
would be final if designated as final and if they otherwise were final judgments as to
such a claim under our present law.
If no certificate or direction as to finality of judgment were made by the trial
court as to a judgment which disposed of one of several claims in an action, then
whether it were interlocutory or final would depend upon the present rules of appeal.
See extended discussion in 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 208-274 (1953).
'48 RCW 4.56.030 provides, 'Judgment may be given for or against one or more of
several plaintiffs and for or against one or more of several defendants; and it may,
when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties
on each side, as between themselves."
RCW 4.56.040 provides, "In an action against several defendants, the court may, in
its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, whenever a several judg-
ment is proper, leaving the action to proceed against the others."
No case authority indicates that these statutes have been used as authority for sep-
arate judgments on separate causes of action pleaded in one suit but tried separately.
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